Imagine
you are watching a movie in which an actor is sitting in a cafeteria
with a jacket slung over his shoulder. The camera then cuts to a close-up
and his jacket is now over the back of his chair. You might think
that everyone would notice this obvious editing mistake. Yet, recent
research on visual memory has found that people are surprisingly poor
at noticing large changes to objects, photographs, and motion pictures
from one instant to the next (see Simons & Levin, 1997 for a review).
Although researchers have long noted the existence of such "change
blindness" (e.g., Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975; French, 1953;
Friedman, 1979; Hochberg, 1986; Kuleshov, 1987; McConkie & Zola,
1979; Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974), recent demonstrations by John
Grimes and others have led to a renewed interest in the problem of
change detection. The new theoretical ideas and paradigms resulting
from this resurgence in the study of visual memory are the focus of
this special issue.
In his demonstration, Grimes (1996) showed observers photographs of
natural scenes for a later memory test. While they were studying an
image, scanning from one object to another, details of the scene were
changed during a saccade. Observers often missed surprisingly large
changes (e.g., 2 people exchanging heads). This finding was consistent
with earlier work on the failure to integrate information across saccades
(e.g., Henderson, 1997; Irwin, 1991; Rayner & Pollatsek, 1983),
but in some ways was a more striking demonstration because the changes
were so clearly visible to observers when the change occurred during
a fixation. Furthermore, Grimes used photographs rather than simple
novel objects or letters, thereby bringing demonstrations of change
blindness closer to everyday perceptual experience.
More recently, several labs have shown that change blindness for objects
in natural scenes can occur during a fixation if the effects of a
saccade are simulated by disrupting the retinal transient normally
accompanying a change. For example, change blindness can occur when
a blank screen is inserted between the original and changed image
(e.g., Blackmore, Brelstaff, Nelson, & Troscianko, 1995; French,
1953; Gur & Hilgard, 1975; Pashler, 1988; Rensink, O'Regan, &
Clark, 1997; Simons, 1996). People also show change blindness when
the original and altered image are separated by a "mudsplash" (O'Regan,
Rensink, & Clark, in press), by a cut or pan in a motion picture
(Hochberg, 1986; Levin & Simons, 1997; Simons, 1996), and even
by a real-world disruption (Simons & Levin, 1998). Recent studies
build on early work on change detection (e.g., French, 1953; Friedman,
1979; McConkie & Zola, 1979; Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974) by
systematically examining the role of attention in change detection
successes and failures (for a recent review see Simons & Levin,
1997; a compilation of all studies of change detection is under development
and is available on the world wide web at http://coglab.wjh.harvard.edu/CB/Cblist.html).
Although a number of
paradigms have been used to study changed detection, the two most
frequently used are the "Flicker" paradigm (Rensink et al., 1997)
and the "Forced Choice Detection" paradigm (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips,
1974; Simons, 1996). In the flicker paradigm, an original and modified
image are presented in rapid alternation with a blank screen between
them. Observers respond as soon as they detect the changing object.
Research using this paradigm has produced two primary findings: 1)
observers rarely detect changes during the first cycle of alternation,
and some changes are not detected even after nearly one minute of
alternation (Rensink et al., 1997); and 2) changes to objects in the
"center of interest" of a scene are detected more readily than peripheral
or "marginal interest" changes (Rensink et al., 1997), suggesting
that attention is focused on central objects either more rapidly or
more often, thereby allowing faster change detection. In the forced
choice detection paradigm, observers only receive one view of each
scene before responding, so the total duration of exposure to the
initial scene can be controlled more precisely. Furthermore, because
only a subset of the images have changes, signal detection analyses
can be used and both accuracy and latency can be used as dependent
measures. Both the
flicker paradigm and the forced choice detection paradigm are intentional
change detection tasks in that observers know that changes will occur
and actively search the display to find differences. This work demonstrates
that observers are change blind even when their primary task is to
search for change. Other change detection studies examine detection
performance under divided attention conditions. For example, observers
in Grimes' (1996) study were aware that changes might occur and were
asked to report the changes when they happened, but their primary
task was to study the images for a later recognition task. Another
recent approach has been to examine change detection with completely
incidental encoding - observers view the display without knowing that
it might change (see Mack & Rock, 1998 for a discussion of the
difference between inattention and divided attention). Many of these
studies use motion picture or real-world methodologies, allowing richer
insights into the sorts of representations people spontaneously form
under natural viewing conditions (see Simons & Levin, 1997 for
a review). As with intentional change detection tasks, under incidental
encoding conditions, observers are blind to marginal interest changes.
For example, when viewing motion picture stimuli, naïve observers
consistently miss changes to marginal interest objects occurring across
shifts in camera position, or "cuts" (Levin & Simons, 1997).
Findings of change blindness
for marginal interest objects in scenes and motion pictures, together
with evidence from the flicker paradigm that changes to central objects
are detected more readily, lead to the conclusion that attention is
necessary for change detection - the details of an object will only
be retained if attention is focused on the changing feature. If observers
could "take in" an entire scene with a single attentional fixation,
they could detect changes anywhere in an image with equal facility.
Instead, observers apparently must scan an image, encoding the scene
piecemeal (Rensink et al., 1997). In order to retain information about
an object or its properties from one view to the next, observers must
re-code the information, explicitly comparing the abstracted representation
of the initial object to the changed object (Simons, 1996). Objects
that are not re-coded are not remembered in any detail. Given the
number of potential features and objects in a typical natural scene
(effectively an infinite number), many, if not most aspects of a scene
will not be preserved across views. Because observers are more likely
to focus attention on important objects, they are more likely to notice
changes to objects in the center of interest of a scene.
Although attention appears to
be necessary for change detection, it may not be sufficient. With
incidental encoding, observers sometimes miss changes to central objects
as well. For example, all observers failed to notice when the central
object in a brief motion picture (a soda bottle) was replaced by a
box following a brief pan away from the table (Simons, 1996). Furthermore,
when naïve observers viewed films of simple action sequences,
nearly 2/3 of the them failed to notice when the central actor in
the scene was replaced by a different actor (Levin & Simons, 1997;
see also Simons, 1996). Change blindness for central objects can occur
in the real world as well (Simons & Levin, 1998). In a recent
study, one experimenter approached a pedestrian (the subject) to ask
for directions. During their conversation, two other people rudely
interrupted them by carrying a door between the experimenter and the
pedestrian. During the time that the subject's view was obstructed,
the first experimenter was replaced by a different experimenter. Only
50 percent of observers noticed the change even though the two experimenters
wore different clothing, were different heights and builds, had different
haircuts, and had noticeably different voices (Simons & Levin,
1998). Unless observers attend to and encode the specific features
that change, they will not detect the difference. Simply attending
to an object does not guarantee a complete representation of its features.
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